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THE HONORABLE KENNETH W. STARR
Kenneth W. Starr is currently serving as Independent Counsel in the
Whitewater Case. Judge Starr is a partner in the Washington, D.C.
office of Kirkland & Ellis and an adjunct professor at New York Uni-
versity School of Law. Judge Starr has served on the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia and as Solicitor General
of the United States. Judge Starr is involved in many professional
affiliations and has served as President of the Institute of Judicial
Administration and as a fellow of the American Bar Foundation.
We are gathered here to discuss the civil justice system. If I may be
permitted one aside before we begin, I think it is important to note that
so much ultimately revolves around the people and the system and the
integrity of the people in the system.
When I was a young senior associate, now many years ago, and look-
ing ahead with the hope of becoming a partner in my law firm at that
time, I was called upon to be in the great state of Florida to handle a
very sensitive matter at the Kennedy Space Center for a private client
that had gotten into some difficulty with the United States government.
We knew right away that as the matter went to litigation, we would
need local counsel in addition to national counsel to handle the matter.
We were fortunate enough to engage a leading lawyer of Florida,
Harris Dittmar, of Jacksonville, who has a wonderful reputation for
both civil work and criminal work. Dittmar had recently and successful-
ly tried a very important case representing Senator Edward Gurney of
Florida Dittmar said, in response to my questions, that one of the most
important things in any justice system is that when a statement is being
made in court by a lawyer, that the judge can place his or her confi-
dence in that statement, and that the jury can place their confidence in
what the lawyer says. So the old-fashioned virtues of integrity and can-
dor with the court and with the trier of fact reflect what is basic to the
morality of law-that law has meaning, that facts have meaning, and
that we treat both the law and the facts with great respect. Even as we
zealously represent the particular interests of our client--as we are
charged with doing as officers of the court-we must respect the law,
we must respect the facts, and we must not take liberties with either.
I wanted to reflect with you on one almost paradoxical institution in
the civil justice system-and indeed, in our entire system of govern-
ment-and that, of course, is the civil jury. What I propose to do is to
very briefly talk about the evolving roles of the civil jury in our democ-
racy.
I would like to first reflect on the philosophy and theory of the civil
jury and then move to some observations about how best to use the
jury system in our constitutional democracy. I think everyone in the
room knows that the civil jury has an extraordinarily long pedigree. The
Magna Charta guaranteed the right. It was in a slightly different form
than we have today. In fact, one reporter in the seventeenth century
reported a case to the following effect In the criminal setting, the ju-
rors acquitted a prisoner contrary to the evidence, and for that they
were fined and imprisoned and they were bound for the behavior of the
prisoner during the prisoner's life. So much for independence of the
jury.
Nevertheless, the idea slowly grew that it was important for the jury
to be able to exercise its judgment On this side of the Atlantic, it was
clear in our colonial period, as well as in the revolutionary period, that
the jury was of truly special significance. We all learned as schoolchil-
dren the cry "No taxation without representation." That was, of course,
a huge rallying cry at the time of the revolution. Yet, what we have only
imperfectly understood is that our forbearers, the colonists, were not
simply railing about representation in Parliament. Rather, they were
aggrieved about the lack of representation in vice admiralty courts in
the United States where crown-appointed judges were sitting without
juries. So the issue to the colonists was not simply taxes. It wasn't tax
relief. It was the diminution of something that was viewed as virtually
sacred to a free people, the right to a jury trial. This was something
that had moral significance to our forbearers-the idea that there was
an erosion by parliamentary action of public participation in govern-
ment-and this affected the liberties of English persons.
After the Revolution and the Articles of Confederation came, of
course, the great debate over the Constitution. There was no debate
over the right to a jury trial with respect to criminal cases. Indeed, that
right was secured in the constitutions of all thirteen of the states, and
the new Federal Constitution clearly contemplated that right as well.
Nevertheless, the Constitution was silent with respect to the right to a
jury trial in civil cases. This reticence was one of the rallying cries of
the Antifederalists. One pamphleteer at the time contended that repre-
sentation on juries is more important than representation in the legisla-
ture. That may seem like idiosyncratic sentiment, but it was a sentiment
shared by no lesser like than Mr. Jefferson.
The upshot of this wave of public opinion was the Seventh Amend-
ment, which, of course, guarantees the right in civil cases to a jury trial
"[iun Suits at common law where the value of controversy shall exceed
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twenty dollars."' A dollar went farther in those days, but the idea was
that if it was a case of some consequence, you should have the right to
put your case in front of the jury. The language of the Seventh Amend-
ment is particularly critical in what great respect it shows for the jury.
"[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court
of the United States ..... 2
That's it No "second bite at the apple." That's according to the rules
of the common law. Obviously, there is J.N.O.V., and everyone who has
been through civil procedure knows that there are methods for over-
turning verdicts that are against the weight of evidence. However, a
properly substantiated verdict enjoys constitutional status.
And thus it was as a result of the great debate in the thirteen states
that the jury was enshrined as a fundamental institution in our democ-
racy. It has since that time captured the attention of some of the lead-
ing historians and scholars, in addition to lawyers and judges. Political
scientist Jeffrey Abramson, in his book We, the Jury, offers this obser-
vation: "No other institution of government rivals the jury in placing
power so directly in the hands of citizens." '
The jury is unique in our political system because it combines ele-
ments of participatory democracy. It is a citizen's check on the adminis-
tration of justice and the enforcement of law, with the potential for
counter majoritarian decision-making. If there is a law reflecting the
views of the majority, at times, the jury can in fact engage in non-appli-
cation of that law.
And this dichotomy, this ultimate faith in the people represented by
the microcosm of the jury, seems to me to be at the very moral essence
of our system of government in an increasingly diverse and heteroge-
nous society. It is, in short, one of the things that binds us, the people,
together in our 260 million persons.
A half century after the founding, a young and very bright French
aristocrat who came over here to look at our prison system, Alexis de
Tocqueville, marveled at the importance of what he saw-which was a
lot of things when he was over here. He was a great and prescient soci-
ologist and political scientist, and he marveled at the importance of
juries in the United States. To him, the jury was "above all, a political
1. U.S. CONST. amend VIL
2. Id
3. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOC-
IcCY 1 (1994).
institution"4 -"political" in the higher Aristotelian sense of 'life togeth-
er as the people.' The jury was an institution that to Tocqueville was as
vital as any one he saw here, in the march towards universal suffrage.
There clearly were massive imperfections and exclusions from the right
to vote. But he saw, prescient as he was, the march of history. There
would be a completion of that in the fullness of time, but, in the mean-
time, he saw the jury as standing as an institution that was quite as
important as the idea of no one being excluded from the franchise.
Like the Antifederalists of the 1780s and 1790s, Tocqueville noted that
juries and the jury system gave the citizenry a stake in government, a
voice in the way the process of government plays out. He also recog-
nized another important role for the jury. While he acknowledged it as
a political and judicial institution, he was, however, most impressed by
the important socializing effect of jury service. He recognized the jury
as an institution for inculcating the Republic's citizens with civic virtue.
Jurors learned respect for the rule of law by taking the oath of office
and being instructed by a judge regarding the law of the cases on which
they served, and their duty to apply it faithfully. This process also
showed jurors that they, as citizens, had an important role in their own
governance. Tocqueville concluded:
I think that the main reason for the practical intelligence and political good sense
of the Americans is their long experience with juries in civil cases. I do not know
whether a jury is useful to the litigants, but I am sure it is very good for those
who have to decide the case. I regard it as one of the most effective means of
popular education at society's disposal.
Tocqueville's point bears repeating. It is not only a question of whether
civil juries are useful to the litigants. Indeed, the litigants sometimes may
find the jury a bit of an impediment. Rather, juries are good because they
make good citizens.
From the pamphleteers of the Revolution to the Antifederalists and to
Tocqueville, I think we can clearly identify roles for the jury going be-
yond the functional, practical need for achieving hopefully a just out-
come in a particular case. We can thus view the jury as a check on offi-
cial power, a way of bringing the public into the judicial branch and
educating the jury, the people, about the law and the values of the rule
of law. But, ultimately, in Tocquevillian terms, we can view the jury as a
school for citizenship, which is critical in a democracy and especially a
democracy that suffers stresses and strains as any modem democracy
does.
4. ALEMS DETOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 272 (Mayer ed. 1969).
5. Id. at 296.
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Much is written these days about the power that is wielded by civil
juries. Some would say that the jury is the voice of the people, and that
it protects the individual, the disenfranchised, the unpopular, the dispos-
sessed, from governmental abuse and from corporate misfeasance.
Others opine that the jury system is merely a redistributive lottery that
has simply run amok That is certainly a voice that is articulated outside
the United States these days about our jury system, by interests that are
otherwise quite admiring of much of America's legal institutions, but
nonetheless skeptical of certain aspects of it.
Regardless of whether jury power is good or bad, I think it is indis-
putable that as the nation has grown, so too has the power and influence
of juries in American life. One need only pick up a paper cup in which
one's morning coffee is found to see from time to time these days warn-
ings, "Very hot." I think we may even know a case that may have given
rise to that warning. Judge Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit has observed
fairly recently in a popular piece, extrajudicially, that in some ways the
modem-day American jury has become a mini-legislature with the ability
to affect and shape policies nationwide by getting attention with a large
damage verdict which will necessarily change behavior.6 Indeed, as the
scope of litigation grows, the effect of a jury verdict obviously grows as
well.
The best example of what Judge Kozinski was getting at is the class
action jury. When the power of a jury is aggregated to deal with a class
action, often nationwide in scope, one can readily see how the legislative
function of that jury can in fact be quite enormous. It is, perhaps, that
aspect of the civil jury's power that has gained the most recent attention
with respect to jury issues-the jury in class actions.
Nationwide class action juries are still a relatively new phenomenon,
and the issues that arise out of a national class action resolving issues in
a jury setting continue to unfold. But originally, class action jury trials
were limited to more traditional models of class actions, such as a
stockholders' securities suit or an antitrust suit The premise was that
behavior on Wall Street affects the nation, so it was more efficient to
have it resolved at one time.
But cases such as Judge Reavley's renowned opinion in Jenkins v.
Raymark Industries7 for the Fifth Circuit, approving certification of a
6. Alex Kozinsid, The Case of Punitive Damages v. Democracy, WALL ST. J., Jan.
19, 1995, at A18.
7. 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
class of thousands of asbestos-related injuries in 1986, initiated the use
of the class action in the mass tort context.
Judge Reavley noted that despite the fact that substantial differences
frequently exist among the circumstances of the injuries of individual
plaintiffs, in these types of cases there are great efficiencies gained in
avoiding duplicative hearings. This was a matter really of common
sense-the same facts would be tried over and over again, and indeed in
the same jurisdiction by Judge Parker of the Eastern District of Texas,
and there had been a learning process as a result of that. So, trying what
could be identified as common issues may indeed guide other courts to
adopt this use of the class mechanism.
Judge Reavley in fact proved to be prescient With increasing frequen-
cy, a number of cases-tort cases, and with the addition of jury trial
rights to Title VII, employment discrimination cases-are more frequently
handled using this "common issues jury" trial approach.
Now, it should be noted that logistically, in the context of complex lit-
igation, the same jury cannot possibly hear both the common issues
phase and then each of the perhaps thousands of individualized phases.
No juror or judge could effectively without essentially having to devote
his or her entire career to that activity. Rather, we are speaking, of
course, of bifurcation. The trials are bifurcated and one jury hears the
common issues of liability, and then other, subsequent juries, if there is
not a settlement, hear the individualized issues.
Now, this increasingly common form of class certification has become
much more closely watched and has raised an issue about the role of the
jury and the limits placed on the role of the jury by the Seventh Amend-
ment A number of courts of appeals have examined class certifications
in the face of challenges that this procedure violated the Seventh
Amendment's proscription against reexamining facts found by a jury,
identified by the Supreme Court's controlling decision two generations
ago in a case, a very short opinion, called Gasoline Products.8
Recent decisions of Judge Reavley's court, the Fifth Circuit, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit have taken the
view that the Seventh Amendment may not permit this kind of jury trial.
The Seventh Circuit analyzed the Seventh Amendment issue in depth in a
very controversial case called In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc.9 In that
case, the district court had certified a class of hemophiliacs who alleged
that the suppliers of blood products acted negligently in failing to screen
blood to detect the HIV virus. The trial court in that case envisioned that
common issues, such as whether the suppliers had acted negligently,
8. Gasoline Products Co., Inc. v. Champlin Ref. Co., 283 U.S. 494 (1931).
9. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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would be tried by one jury and individualized issues, such as compara-
tive negligence, proximate cause, and the like, would be tried by various
follow-up juries. The Seventh Circuit decertified the class-over a
dissent--due to what it determined was a failure to comply with the Sev-
enth Amendment
Why was that? The court reasoned that the right to a jury trial, con-
ferred by the Seventh Amendment, was a right to have juriable issues
determined by the first jury impaneled to hear them, provided there are
no errors warranting a new trial, and was not to be reexamined by an-
other finder of fact. The court did acknowledge that bifurcations, like the
customary division between liability and damages, are compatible with
the Seventh Amendment-that is settled in law-but emphasized that
trial judges must "carve at the joint." The Seventh Circuit concluded in
that case that dividing the elements of liability between those suitable for
class treatment on the one hand and those that are too individualized for
common adjudication on the other hand does not result in that neat
Thanksgiving Day kind of carving. It is not the clean division of issues
that is compatible, as Chief Judge Posner put it, with the Seventh
Amendment
The Fifth Circuit recently followed the Seventh Circuit's lead in
Castano v. American Tobacco Co.,'0 a case in which I in fact argued.
There, the Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's order certifying a
nationwide class action that included all past and present smokers. The
certification order purported to separate common issues relevant to the
defendant's conduct from individual issues regarding the conduct and
decisions of each smoker and certified only the former for class treat-
ment
In reversing that order, the Fifth Circuit, which was unanimous, had
no petition for rehearing or suggestion for rehearing even filed, nor a
cert. petition, so that was the end of the line for that particular issue in
the Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit stressed-and these are the words of the Fifth Circuit
speaking through Judge Smith-"the risk that in order to make this class
action manageable, the court will be forced to bifurcate issues in viola-
tion of the Seventh Amendment.""
So the Fifth Circuit aligned itself with the Seventh Circuit in Rhone-
Poulenc, taking the view that you must have one jury resolving all liabil-
10. 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996).
11. Id. at 750.
ity issues. Other courts, including the First Circuit in Boston, have ad-
hered to this view of the Seventh Amendment and their interpretation of
the Supreme Court's Gasoline Products decision.
But there are other courts that have gone the other way. Does it sound
as if this is heading for the Supreme Court of the United States? It is a
big issue. It is one of the biggest issues out there now, in terms of civil
justice. Most recently, the Ninth Circuit in Valentino v. Carter-Wallace,
Inc.,2 which had a lot of popular attention as well, rejected the argu-
ment that a separate trial of common issues, which would leave individu-
al issues to follow-up juries, violated the Seventh Amendment The Ninth
Circuit rejected that position, and the Ninth Circuit is not alone in taking
this view. Indeed, the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, as well as a num-
ber of district courts in circuits that have not yet spoken to this issue,
have likewise rejected such Seventh Amendment challenges.
This circuit split represents two very different and ultimately irrecon-
cilable approaches to this interplay between the Seventh Amendment and
the role of the jury in aggregating and dealing with issues of aggregate
justice.
I want to close with a return to the broader Tocquevillian notions, Mr.
Jefferson's notions, and the Antifederalists' concerns about the jury,
because one of the great and burning issues right now with respect to
the civil jury is what should its size be. The Judicial Conference of the
United States has recently taken steps that would suggest that the pres-
ent authorization of the federal system for a jury of six, typically with
alternates, will in fact be the order of the day. I should hasten to note, as
I am sure everyone appreciates, that the six-person jury has long since
been found constitutional as compatible with Seventh Amendment norms
by the United States Supreme Court. We are not talldng about whether
there is a constitutional right to a twelve-person jury. Rather, we are
talking about what is a good thing, and there is a real clash, I think, that
is underway and has now essentially been resolved in favor of what I
would call the efficiency modeL It is more efficient for busy judges and
busy courtrooms to seat juries of six and to manage the litigation. If
someone gets sick, if someone is late, it is just a lot easier to manage a
smaller jury for all kinds of fairly self-evident reasons. But there has also
been a fair amount of discussion and study regarding the quality of the
decision-making in juries of various sizes-what size jury is the best in
terms of achieving the right result, how does size affect jury dynamics
inside the jury room, and other similar questions.
I have not made my own independent study of this issue, and I do not
have a view. But what I fear is being lost in the debate-in the efficiency
12. 97 F.3d 1227 (9th Cir. 1996).
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and fairness debate-is the scope of the focus. It would be a good thing
for us to broaden the lens and to think once again of the jury-which is
clearly here to stay in our constitutional traditions-more in
Tocquevillian terms and to think of the jury more as Mr. Jefferson did.
This is especially true in a time in which the country is bound to face
additional internal stresses, and could richly benefit from an institution
capable of educating our citizens and instituting in them a sense of civic
duty.
Is it a better thing for us to bring more persons into the jury system
and to say, with all due respect, you will serve? I have made a number of
suggestions in the past with respect to the virtual elimination of exemp-
tions from jury service, and I won't get into strikes, preemptories, and
the other kinds of issues with respect to the actual composition of juries.
Rather, I will leave you with this philosophical, or at least Tocquevillian,
thought: that it is a good thing for the country for the jury system to be
viewed as a form of civic responsibility. Having served on the jury com-
mittee of the United States Court for the District of Columbia, serving
with two renowned United States district court judges when I was privi-
leged to serve as a circuit judge I read the exit questionnaires that we
ask each juror serving in federal court to answer. I observed that the
jurors were saying, "It may have been inconvenient for me, it may have
been difficult to find parking around the courthouse, there may have
been some inefficiencies, the food in the cafeteria isn't particularly
good," and the usual kinds of complaints that we can all understand at a
very human level, but at a much more elevated and moral and enduring
level, those jurors were saying-and I think Mr. Tocqueville must have
been smiling when we were reading those jury questionnaires--"It is
good that we were here. It is a good thing that we served. We learned
from that experience. It makes us proud to be part of the citizenry. It
makes us proud of our government We feel very good about the experi-
ence, and we would recommend that others have the experience as
well."
We should not lose sight of Tocqueville's understanding of the valued
role of civil juries, an understanding ratified by the exit questionnaires of
recent jurors, when we discuss what the civil jury should look like.
We should, in determining the future of the civil jury, focus not just on
efficiency, but rather think about what is in the best interest, over the
long term, of the United States.

